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I.  NO CONTRACTS 
Contracts have been a central feature of western law for at least a 
thousand years, and they form an extremely important part of American 
legal practice.  However, American law schools virtually never teach the 
subject.  As far as I am aware, there is no law school that includes a 
course on contracts in its first-year curriculum.  A few teach contracts as 
an upper level elective that a small number of students take, but even 
this very limited exposure to the subject is probably restricted to a 
minority of law schools. 
To be sure, there is a course called Contracts that is included in the 
first-year curriculum of every law school, but this is not a course in 
 
 *  University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I want to thank all the participants in the AALS Section on Socio-Economics, and particularly Robert Ashford, for educating me about this subject. 
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contracts at all.  It is a course in judicial adjudication of disputes regarding 
contracts.  In learning how courts resolve these disputes, students 
naturally get a glimpse of some of the underlying issues involved in 
contracts themselves, just as a course that explored the way courts 
resolve disputes about buildings would give students a glimpse of civil 
engineering.  However, such a course would not be considered a “Civil 
Engineering” course, and the course taught in law schools that is labeled 
“Contracts” is not a contracts course.  Most of the students who take this 
course never read even a single contract, and even fewer read a thirty- or 
forty-page “long form” contract of the sort that is common in transactions 
between firms, or a “standard form” contract that firms commonly use in 
consumer transactions.1  Similarly, most of these students are never 
given any instruction about the way to negotiate a contract,2 to draft a 
contract, or even to interpret a contract during the time when the contract 
is governing the relationship between the parties.  Their exposure to the 
subject begins at the point when the contractual relationship between the 
parties has broken down. 
This disconnect between contractual relationships and the law school 
“Contracts” course is illustrated by the structure of contemporary legal 
practice.  In most large firms, the bulk of the contract work is carried out 
by the corporate department.  It is this department that negotiates 
contracts, drafts contracts, and interprets contracts during the course of 
the contractual relationship between the parties.  If the relationship 
breaks down, however, and one of the parties files suit against the other 
to enforce its rights under the contract, the corporate lawyers who have 
worked on the contract will typically refer the matter to the litigation 
department of the firm.  Sometimes, this is motivated by the corporate 
lawyers’ desire to avoid getting involved in the inevitably unpleasant 
process of litigation, and thus alienating a good client, but the principal 
reason why corporate lawyers refer contract litigation to a separate 
department is that litigation is regarded as a distinctly different expertise.  
Law schools provide students with a good deal of training in this area of 
expertise.  In addition to contract litigation, they teach torts litigation, 
property litigation, criminal law litigation, constitutional law litigation, 
civil procedure, criminal procedure, evidence, and a variety of other 
 
 1. There are, of course, exceptions.  See, e.g., ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 724 (3d ed. 1997) (providing the text of a contract for analysis); see also Robert A. Hillman, 
Enriching Case Reports, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1197, 1203–04 (2000) (discussing how supplementing case reports with documents from practice enriches a contracts course).  2. Again, some contracts teachers use negotiation exercises.  See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., A Property Law Instructor Looks at the Contract Law Course, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1215, 1222–23 (2000). 
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litigation related courses.  But they do not teach contracts. 
Why do law schools overlook this enormously important subject?  
Why have they done so for over one hundred years, ever since the 
inception of the modern legal curriculum, without seeming to notice the 
omission that their students will rapidly discover upon graduation, if 
they have not already done so during their summer jobs at law firms?  
No explicit rationale for this omission can be found in the descriptive 
literature of any law school, nor is there any rationale that can be readily 
inferred from the stated mission of these institutions.  Elementary 
schools avoid teaching particle physics because it is beyond the intellectual 
capacities of their students, public policy schools avoid teaching 
techniques for bribing public officials because they are immoral, 
psychology departments avoid teaching phrenology because it is invalid, 
and medical schools avoid teaching romantic poetry because it is outside 
their area of concern.  Educators in these institutions could readily offer 
these rationales if they were asked to justify their exclusions, but none of 
these rationales can explain why law schools fail to teach contracts. 
Rather, the explanation, as for so many of the other pedagogic lacunae 
in modern legal education, lies with C.C. Langdell.  Like many legal 
scholars of his day, Langdell believed that the law, and more specifically 
the common law, was animated by enduring principles that inhered in 
Anglo-American legal culture.3  These principles, profound and recondite, 
were not directly articulated by any government authority, but emerged 
in the course of judicial adjudication.  Students could discern them by 
reading adjudicatory records, that is, appellate decisions.  Langdell’s 
spectacularly influential pedagogic method was based upon this theory.  
In his view, when students read appellate decisions, they were 
conducting primary research into the visible manifestations of the law’s 
enduring principles, just as natural scientists researched the enduring 
principles of nature by observing chemical reactions in the laboratory.4  
 
 3. See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 2, 53 (1983) (discussing how Langdell and his colleagues promulgated a distinctive system of legal thought, called classical orthodoxy); Dennis Patterson, Langdell’s Legacy, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 196, 203 (1995) (analyzing Langdell’s legacy as an explanatory approach to the nature of law); G. Edward White, The Impact of Legal Science on Tort Law, 1880–
1910, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 220–25 (1978) (describing Langdell’s conception of legal science as both a revolutionary change in methods of acquiring knowledge and a static, dogmatic orthodoxy). 
 4. See WILLIAM C. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL AND THE RISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT 23–59 (1982); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 51–53 (1983). 
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When law professors interrogated the students in class about the internal 
logic of the decisions, they were amplifying and refining the 
understanding that the students derived from their research.  Of course, 
no one believes in Langdell’s theory of law anymore, so much so that it 
is difficult to describe it without lapsing into sarcasm, but the pedagogic 
method used in law schools is still based on this concept of law. 
Langdell’s pedagogic method focuses entirely on judicial decisions.  
This has the virtue of using primary source material, rather than the dull-
as-dishwater treatises that still dominate legal education in Europe, but it 
does not provide a way of including any other primary source material.  
In particular, it does not include contracts.  While the Langdellian 
method can be used to teach contract adjudication—in fact, “contracts” 
was Langdell’s subject—it cannot be used to teach students about 
contracts themselves.  A contract is an agreement between two private 
parties which each party enters into for its individual advantage.  A 
contract is not an effort by a public official to discern the underlying 
principles of common law, even though it is often shaped by explicitly 
stated legal rules and sometimes shaped by the desire to circumvent 
these rules.  Thus, a pedagogic methodology that treats its source material 
as an effort to discern enduring legal principles will regard contracts as 
beneath its notice, the chattering of people too self-interested and 
mundane to see anything but shadows on the walls of the cave. 
Legal thought, to be sure, has evolved a great deal since Langdell.  His 
approach, now disparagingly labeled formalism, was succeeded by the 
legal realists, the legal process school, law and economics, and critical 
legal studies.5  Although these movements rejected virtually every element 
of formalism, they retained its emphasis on discovering the animating 
principles of law and of looking at the law from the perspective of a 
public official, most commonly a judge.  Legal process asks public officials, 
such as constitution drafters and legislators, to allocate authority to the 
most competent official decisionmaker and then advises judges to make 
the proper decisions on the basis of their competence.6  Law and 
economics in its early form asked legislators and, most often, judges to 
make decisions on the basis of efficiency, while critical legal studies 
asked them to base their decisions on a concern for social justice.  All 
 
 5. Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the 
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1394–1402 (1996).  See 
generally GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END (1995) (describing the historical move from legal modernism, which was influenced by Langdell, to postmodern forms of jurisprudence such as law and economics and critical legal studies). 
 6. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and 
Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS li (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, eds., 1994). 
RUBIN.DOC 9/17/2019  2:56 PM 
[VOL. 41:  55, 2004]  Why Law Schools Do Not Teach Contracts 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 59 
these movements, therefore, regarded legal theory as a framework that 
public officials could utilize to reach optimal or at least desirable decisions.  
The legal actions of private parties, by negative implication, were 
regarded as beyond or beneath the realm of legal theory.  These actions 
were merely efforts to conform or to evade the legal rules, and lacked 
any underlying logic that could be conveyed to law students.  Teaching 
law students about these private legal actions—how lawyers create 
contracts, interpret contracts, advise clients, and negotiate with each 
other—could be nothing other than a “how to” course, a set of 
instructions about practical tasks that did not belong on the university 
curriculum.  They were merely plumbing, entirely divorced from legal 
theory. 
There is, to be sure, a good justification for this point of view.  To 
teach a body of information as an academic subject, one needs a 
generalized methodology of some sort.  This is not necessarily a theory, 
and certainly not a theory in the sense of a complete explanation that 
predicts future occurrences, like quantum electrodynamics.  Rather, it is 
a unified approach to the subject matter that enables students to answer a 
set of evaluative questions.  Confronted with a narrative of past 
occurrences, history students using the methodology they have been 
taught can discuss the nature and reliability of the account, the political, 
social, and economic causes of the event it describes, and the effects of 
that event on subsequent events.  Confronted with a judicial decision, 
law students using the methodology they have been taught can identify 
the facts of the case, its holding and dicta, the doctrine on which the 
judge’s decision is based, and the extent to which the decision is 
consistent with other decisions based on the same doctrine.  However, 
law students did not have any methodology that they could utilize when 
confronted with a contract, which is at least one reason why their 
teachers have protected them from this embarrassing event.  The 
contract was regarded as a set of particularized provisions reflecting 
nothing more than the parties’ effort to secure their own advantages and 
memorialize the idiosyncratic details of their transaction.  One might 
offer the students some techniques or stratagems for increasing their 
client’s advantage, but that mundane level of instruction, akin to a set of 
lessons on “How to Improve Your Game of Golf,” was all that could be 
done. 
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Socioeconomics provides a methodology for understanding contracts.7  
Jeffrey Harrison has recently provided an illuminating account of the 
way that socioeconomics can inform and expand existing contract 
courses.8  In addition, socioeconomics creates the possibility that contracts, 
and not merely contract adjudication, can be taught in law schools as an 
academic subject.  Its merger of economics and sociology provides a 
methodology for understanding both contracts negotiated between 
business parties and contracts negotiated between businesses and consumers.  
At first, one might assume that contracts between business firms would 
be analyzed according to the economic branch of socioeconomics  
because businesses are presumed to be rational actors, while contracts 
involving consumers would lend themselves to sociological analysis.  
However, socioeconomics does not merely merge these two fields, 
which are, after all, both forms of social science, by simply placing them 
side by side.  Rather, it represents an interpenetration of the two, 
together with other branches of social science, producing a mode of 
understanding that simultaneously recognizes the economic and the 
social aspects of law and legal action. 
Part II of this Article will discuss contracts between businesses, and  
Part III will discuss contracts between businesses and individuals.  An 
individual is a natural person; a business is an organized group of natural 
persons acting collectively.  It is assumed that any such organized group 
is a business, even if it is not designed to serve commercial purposes, 
such as a church or a fraternal society, and no matter how small, such as 
a two person partnership.  An individual acting in a professional capacity, 
such as a solo doctor or attorney, is a consumer, not a business, and a 
family is a set of separate individuals.  Businesses contract with each 
other as businesses, or organizations, and individuals contract with 
businesses in the role of consumer or supplier, usually of their labor but 
sometimes of a creative or other product.  Individuals also contract with 
other individuals, most often in specialized markets such as real estate or 
used cars.  For simplicity, however, labor contracts and consumer-to-
consumer contracts will not be discussed. 
 
 7. For general descriptions of socioeconomics, see Robert Ashford, Socio-Economics: 
What Is Its Place in Law Practice?, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 611; Jeffrey L. Harrison, Law and 
Socioeconomics, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 224 (1999).  8. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Teaching Contracts from a Socioeconomic Perspective, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1233 (2000).  Some of Harrison’s proposals are similar to those in this Article in that Harrison’s proposals would introduce transactional elements.  See id. at 1244–46 (describing a professor’s inclusion of empirical studies dealing with consumer contracts for cars and the activities of corporate counsel in the professor’s classroom discussions). 
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II.  BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS CONTRACTS 
A.   Transaction Cost Economics 
By and large, contracts belong to the world of commerce, and the 
particular social science that focuses on this realm is economics.  
Neoclassical economics was still the dominant approach to this subject 
when interdisciplinary legal scholarship began to supplant the legal 
process school in the 1970s.  According to the neoclassic model, a 
contract is an exchange between a willing buyer and a willing seller.  
Such an exchange will occur whenever the buyer values something that 
the seller owns more highly than the seller does.  For example, a person 
who has just bought a new car may place a much lower value on her old 
car than another person who has no car.  The difference between these 
two values constitutes a surplus that can be realized by making the 
exchange, that is, by transferring the car to the person who values it 
more highly.  This surplus, according to the neoclassic model, will be 
divided between the parties in accordance with their bargaining ability 
and a variety of other factors.  From a public policy viewpoint, the 
division of the surplus is not important.  What is important is that courts 
be available to enforce the contract, thereby giving the moving party the 
benefit of its bargain.  The reason is that the bargain, being an exchange 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, is efficient, which means 
that it increases social welfare.  However, there are various circumstances 
under which a bargain will be inefficient, including cases in which one 
of the parties is not willing to make the exchange, but does so under 
duress or as a result of a misunderstanding, or cases in which the market 
for the item being transferred fails due to the presence of a monopoly, 
externalities, or information asymmetry. 
The absorption of neoclassic economics into legal scholarship resulted 
in a major shift in the standards for evaluating the judicial enforcement 
of contracts.  Instead of focusing on either the fairness or the doctrinal 
coherence of a court’s decision, scholars began to focus on its efficiency.  
However, the emphasis remained on judicial enforcement.  To some 
extent, this was the result of the tendentious quality that Richard Posner 
imparted to the fledgling field of law and economics through his desire 
to refute the tenets of liberalism,9 but there were at least two more basic 
reasons.  The first was the assumption that the overarching goal of 
 
 9. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4–6 (1972). 
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efficiency would be served as long as the parties were willing actors; the 
particular way in which the surplus was divided was of no concern from 
the efficiency or public policy perspective.  Thus, the contract itself—its 
terms, its structure, and the negotiating strategy of the parties—remained 
a sort of black box, walled off from analytic consideration by its asserted 
efficiency.  The second reason was the assumption, labeled legal 
centralism by Oliver Williamson, that “efficacious rules of law regarding 
contract disputes were in place and were applied by the courts in an 
informed, sophisticated, and low-cost way.”10  To the extent that this 
was not the case, it could be corrected, in Posner’s view, by convincing 
courts to use economic efficiency as the basis for deciding contract 
cases.  As a result of these assumptions, neoclassic economics provided 
a new methodology for analyzing the familiar subject of judicial contract 
adjudication, but like formalism, failed to offer a methodology for the 
analysis of contracts themselves. 
By the early 1980s, it had become apparent to many economists and 
legal scholars that both these assumptions were false, even with respect 
to contracts between businesses.  Litigation is expensive and courts lack 
the knowledge to interpret contracts in a reliable manner; as a result, the 
parties strive to avoid litigation by drafting contracts that are self-
enforcing.11  This means, in turn, that a business-to-business contract is 
not merely an effort to divide a transactional surplus and submit oneself 
to judicial enforcement, but rather a means of private ordering, an effort 
to organize a commercial relationship to achieve a complex variety of 
purposes.  As a result of this insight, the contract itself—its creation, its 
terms, its role in the ongoing relationship between the parties—becomes 
an important subject for economic and legal analysis. 
Transaction cost economics, developed by Williamson, Ronald Coase, 
Douglass North, Armen Alchian, Benjamin Klein, and others, is the 
economics of suboptimality.12  Given economies of scale, as Coase 
 
 10. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 42 (1996).  11. IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 4–5 (1980) (describing contract as exchange relations and discussing how such exchange relations do not always give rise to legal rights); Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 2–17 (1981) (submitting that legal centralism is deficient and arguing that the most significant legal traffic is the centrifugal flow of legal messages, rather than a centripetal flow of cases into official forums); Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 616 (1981); L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27, 27–28 (1980).  12. For representative statements, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 2 (1985); Armen A. Alchian, Specificity, Specialization, and Coalitions, 140 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 34, 36, 38–39 (1984); Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost 
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pointed out, the only reason why the entire world is not organized into a 
single, all-embracing firm is that organizational difficulties produce 
countervailing diseconomies.13  In particular, the firm’s hierarchical 
structure undermines its members’ incentives to be efficient, and the 
opportunities within the hierarchy for excessive intervention and 
inappropriate resistance allow inefficient behaviors to prevail.  Given the 
ability to transfer property by contract, as Coase also pointed out, the 
only reason why property arrangements make an economic difference is 
that transaction costs impede the contracting process.14  In particular, 
uncertainty about future states, people’s inabilities to process information, 
and people’s incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior make 
transactions costly.  Because people are only rational within certain 
bounds and their information processing abilities are limited, these 
organizational and contractual suboptimalities persist over time and are 
never fully “cleared” by the market.  Because people are opportunistic 
and think they can gain an advantage from ambiguity, and because 
money and effort are required to achieve clarity, contracts are often 
incomplete, that is, they do not even take advantage of the information 
that is actually available to the parties.15 
B.  Analyzing Business Contracts 
Transaction cost economics, by addressing these issues, provides a 
methodology for analyzing contracting behavior.  To begin with, it 
provides a framework for understanding why businesses use contracts at 
all.  A contract is an intermediate device between no relationship, or a 
purely competitive relationship, and a hierarchical relationship in an 
integrated organization or firm.16  Businesses enter into contracts because 
they want to bind each other to a particular relationship, either for a 
 
Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 356, 356, 361–62 (1980) (discussing the transaction costs of incomplete contracts due to uncertainty and measurement costs); Douglass C. North, Transaction Costs, Institutions, 
and Economic History, 140 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 7, 7, 10 (1984).  13. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm (1937), in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 18, 23 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter, eds., 1991). 
 14. Id. at 35, 48; R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–19 (1960).  15. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 9–10 (1975) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, MARKETS]; WILLIAMSON, supra note 12, at 64–67. 
 16. See WILLIAMSON, MARKETS, supra note 15, at 8–10. 
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single transaction, a delimited series of transactions, or a long-term 
relationship, without joining together in a single firm.  Conversely, a 
single firm decides whether to produce something itself or contract with 
a separate party—the “make-or-buy” decision—by balancing its ability 
to reach a satisfactory agreement with another party against the 
organizational complexities of internal production.  Often the decision 
turns on the extent to which the production process in question involves 
advance commitments that are irreversible and unsalvageable, such as 
locating a facility near an existing resource, building a machine to 
produce a particular product, or training a group of workers to engage in 
a particular process.17  When such asset specificity is necessary, or more 
precisely, when it has the potential to produce the product at a lower 
price than reliance on reversible and salvageable assets, there will be an 
incentive to engage in long-term contracting in order to obtain the 
commitments necessary to secure the irreversible asset’s value. 
These insights, which can be explained in straightforward, nonmathematical 
terms (always an important goal in dealing with law students) can be 
used in the classroom to analyze actual contracts.  Presented with a 
contract, the students can be asked why the firm is contracting for this 
particular product or service and why it is entering into the particular 
kind of contract that they see in front of them.  For example, a contract 
for sale of a patent by one firm to another might contain an option 
clause, whereby the buyer pays a relatively small amount to control the 
patent for a one-year period and then has the option, upon payment of a 
larger amount, to buy the patent outright.  Students can be asked to 
explain why the buyer would not want to pay the entire purchase price at 
once due to uncertainty, how the buyer could reduce uncertainty through 
initial utilization of the patent, how such utilization would involve 
irreversible, unsalvageable expenditures that would place the seller in a 
position to act opportunistically unless the buyer had an option to secure 
the entire patent, and why the seller could obtain a higher price by 
agreeing to the option than it could by selling the patent outright in the 
first instance.  The students might also be given secondary source 
readings about a given industry—biotechnology, for example—that 
would explain how firms decide whether to purchase patents or generate 
their own discoveries.  To take one more example, the students could be 
shown long-term requirements contracts, of the sort discussed by 
Macneil,18 and asked to explain why the buyer would want to obtain a 
 
 17. Klein & Leffler, supra note 11, at 618–19; Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical 
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 308–09, 313 (1978).  18. IAN R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS 859–71 (2d ed. 1978). 
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commitment from the seller and why the seller would agree. 
Transaction cost economics also provides a methodology for explaining 
the terms that appear in business-to-business contracts.  Most of these 
contracts follow a standard pattern: (1) identify the parties, (2) describe 
the transaction, (3) state the price, (4) specify the means of payment, (5) 
list the representations and warranties made by the seller and, less 
frequently, the buyer, (6) list the covenants and conditions being made by 
the parties, and (7) state enforcement oriented terms, such as an arbitration 
or choice of law clause.  In a pathbreaking article, Ronald Gilson 
explains that these contractual provisions, as drafted by attorneys, are 
designed to reduce transaction costs.19  Gilson uses the standard form 
corporate acquisition contract as his example.  If the parties could agree 
upon the value of the firm being transferred, they could simply record 
that value in dollar form, and the contract drafter’s task would be 
essentially secretarial.  The contract would go forward under the 
neoclassic model because the firm, at its agreed upon value, was worth 
more to the buyer than the seller, perhaps because of synergies with 
other parts of the buyer’s firm.  In many cases, however, the buyer and 
the seller disagree about the value of the firm, or more specifically, the 
earning power of the firm in the immediate future.  The lawyer might 
then draft a contractual provision that allows the seller to remain in 
control of the firm for a one-year period, have the buyer pay what it 
thinks the firm is worth at the beginning of the year, and then require the 
buyer to pay some additional amount if the firm’s performance reflects 
the seller’s higher estimate of its earning power.  As Gilson points out, 
however, this solution creates an incentive problem because the seller, 
anxious to demonstrate the earning power of its firm, might engage in 
short-term practices to enhance earnings during the one-year period, at 
the expense of the firm’s long-term value.  To guard against this 
possibility while preserving the advantages of the variable pricing term, 
the attorney would need to draft conditions and covenants governing the 
seller’s managerial practices.20 
Williamson provides another example of contractual devices to reduce 
transaction costs.  Asset specificity allows a firm to produce a product at 
lower cost, as described above, but makes the firm vulnerable to the 
other firms that purchase the product for resale.  If these firms fail to buy 
 
 19. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset 
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 243 (1984). 
 20. Id. at 265–67. 
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the product, the value of the seller’s specific asset can be lost; knowing 
this, potential buyers are in a position to act opportunistically, to the 
seller’s disadvantage.  The seller, and its attorney, can reduce this risk by 
drafting a contract that requires the buyer to pay a cancellation fee, and 
the buyer will agree to such a term in order to obtain the lower price items 
generated by the specific asset.  Williamson describes such mechanisms 
as hostage taking on the seller’s part.  They are a form of self-help and 
thus a recognition of the costs and uncertainties that legal centralism 
tends to ignore.21  Another more comprehensive strategy to deal with the 
same problem of asset specificity is for the seller to contract with 
multiple buyers through franchise agreements, which are essentially 
agreements imposing a condition that each buyer invest in specific assets 
of its own.22  Such agreements can be regarded as a mutual exchange of 
hostages. 
The examples given thus far involve negotiated terms.  Most business 
contracts, however, are based on forms contracts that circulate among 
attorneys in an industry, or that are promulgated by trade organizations 
such as the American Institute of Architects or the Dramatists’ Guild.23  
The prevalence of these forms is also explained by transaction cost 
economics, as Michael Klausner and Marcel Kahan have shown.24  First, 
and most obviously, drafting a contract is itself a transaction cost.  This 
cost will be counterbalanced by transaction cost savings achieved by the 
negotiated terms when the relationship between the parties possesses 
distinctive or idiosyncratic features, but it will be minimized by using 
standard forms when the relationship is stereotypical.  In virtually every 
transfer of rights from a writer to a publisher, for example, the publisher 
will want to secure the same set of written publication rights, and will 
want the same representations and warranties regarding the originality of 
the work.  Even more important, the rejection of legal centralism recognizes 
that courts often misinterpret contracts in unpredictable ways.  Using a 
standard form reduces this uncertainty because the contracts incorporating 
its terms have already been litigated, and the judicial response to them is 
 
 21. Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support 
Exchange, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 521–22, 524 (1983).  22. Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of 
Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 931–32 (1990).  23. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 762 (1995); Edward L. Rubin, The Phenomenology of Contract: 
Complex Contracting in the Entertainment Industry, 152 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 123, 130–31 (1996); Eric Schanze, Legalism, Economism, and Professional Attitudes 
Toward Institutional Design, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 122 (1993).  24. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate 
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 361–62 (1996); Klausner, supra note 23, at 826–29. 
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known.  Thus, as Klausner points out, standard contract forms, like 
telephones, provide a positive network externality; the item becomes 
more valuable to each person as more people use it.25 
Here again, students can be provided with the texts of these various 
agreements, given guidance about how to read them—just as law school 
begins with guidance about how to read a case—and then asked to 
analyze the contract’s provisions.  Transaction cost economics provides 
a framework for this analysis.  It explains that various contract terms that 
appear, from the neoclassic perspective, as merely profit-maximizing 
efforts to divide a contractual surplus, in fact respond to an underlying 
logic driven by uncertainty, the bounded nature of rationality and the 
consequent suboptimality of firms and markets.  With a relatively simple 
set of concepts, students can understand why the parties used a standard 
form contract or a specially negotiated one, what the buyer and seller 
were trying to achieve with a particular term, why they insisted on that 
term, and why they were willing to accept it or modify it in particular 
ways.  The students can read a contract as they now read a case, 
assessing the decisions made by the person who wrote the document 
according to a conceptual framework. 
To be sure, the conceptual framework for analyzing business-to-
business contracts is more limited.  The motivations that underlie the 
contract drafter’s efforts are generally limited to maximizing her client’s 
wealth and do not include more wide-ranging questions about public 
policy and social justice that sometimes animate a judge.  On the other 
hand, the study of contracts presents an active learning opportunity that 
is absent from the study of judicial decisions.  Practicing lawyers do not 
draft judicial opinions; as a result, opinion drafting is generally not 
regarded as a relevant part of law school courses, which are conceptualized 
as an effort to teach students how to be practicing lawyers.  Rather, the 
students are taught how to interpret contracts, a somewhat passive 
enterprise.  But practicing lawyers draft contracts all the time, and it 
would be highly relevant to a contracts course—a real contracts course, 
that is—to include drafting exercises.  These should not be regarded as 
mere “how-to” exercises, although that is certainly important, but as a 
means of teaching understanding through participation.26  By drafting a 
 
 25. Klausner, supra note 23, at 772.  26. For an argument that understanding requires participation, see MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 7–11 (Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968). 
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contract based on a fact pattern about the relationship between the 
business parties, students will begin to understand how contract drafters 
make decisions and why they use the particular solutions that appear in 
actual contracts.  If they are then given the future results of the fact 
pattern—whether prices went up or down, whether the other party 
performed or defaulted—and then asked to compute how their contract 
served their client in these circumstances, they can be given a visceral 
sense of the uncertainties and informational constraints that shape 
contractual practice. 
Moreover, judicial decisions are not irrelevant to a real contracts 
course.  While questions about how judges interpret contracts should be 
avoided, the theory of positive network externalities suggests that these 
decisions can be viewed from the perspective of the contract drafter.  
The question is how firms using a standard form will respond to a 
judicial interpretation of that form, particularly if the contract is 
incomplete and elicits a significant amount of judicial interpretation.27  If 
the interpretation is unexpected and alters the form’s intended purposes, 
regular users of the form will typically redraft the interpreted clause to 
restore its intended meaning.  In some cases, this will not be possible, 
and the drafter will need to make other adjustments.  Students can be 
given the original form contract, the judicial decision, and the revised 
version of the form.  They can be asked to explain, according to the 
methodology of transaction cost economics, why the drafters responded 
as they did.  By doing so, students will see judicial decisions from the 
perspective of those governed by the decision, that is, from the only 
perspective that the overwhelming majority of them will experience in 
their professional careers and that the small minority who ultimately 
become judges will nonetheless experience for their first twenty or thirty 
years. 
All of this might seem like an application of pure economics to law, even 
if it is not neoclassical economics.  However, transaction cost economics, 
its name notwithstanding, is not pure economics; it is socioeconomics.  
Its break with neoclassicism lies precisely in its recognition of 
sociological factors involving real human and organizational behavior.  
While transaction cost economists often tend to phrase these insights in 
economic sounding terms, their approach represents a real combination 
of economics, organizational theory, and individual psychology.  In 
addition, because of the emphasis on the cost of adjudication, the 
alternative value of self-help, and the choice between public and private 
ordering, law is regarded as an essential element in transaction cost 
 
 27. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of 
Incomplete Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 159–64 (1994). 
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economics, not merely as a field to which economic analysis can be 
applied.  This integration of law and social science at the level of theory 
is another feature of the socioeconomic approach. 
III.  CONSUMER CONTRACTS 
Individuals contract with businesses in various ways, most commonly 
in their capacity as employees or consumers.  As stated, only consumer 
contracts will be considered here; while employment contracts share 
many features with the other contracts that will be discussed, they are an 
integral part of labor law or employment law28 and can be omitted from 
a first-year contracts course on the ground that they would be considered 
in upper-class courses.29  Consumer contracts, however, are generally not 
considered elsewhere in the curriculum.  They represent the overwhelming 
majority of contracts in the United States and raise distinct and 
interesting issues. 
The most notable difference between consumer contracts and 
business-to-business contracts is that consumer contracts are virtually 
never negotiated.  They appear on forms prepared by the business, 
generally in its role of seller, and are offered to the consumer on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis; in other words, they are contracts of adhesion.30  Of 
course, as discussed above, businesses frequently use form contracts as 
well, but use of the form generally represents a conscious decision by 
business parties, who often modify the form, and almost always consider 
modifying it.  Consumers virtually never do either of these things. 
 
 28. But see Susan A. Fitzgibbon, Teaching Unconscionability Through Agreements 
to Arbitrate Employment Claims, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1401, 1401–02 (2000) (asserting that a contracts course could benefit from a discussion of employment agreements).  29. The more precise statement is that employment contracts should be considered in labor law and employment law courses.  In fact, these courses, like almost all the other courses taught in law school, generally focus on judicial decisions. 
 30. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits 
of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995) (discussing how actors characteristically violate the standard rational-choice or expected-utility model because of the limits of cognition); Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective 
Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263 (1993) (describing special risks and problems of consumer form contracts); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of 
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1176–77 (1983) (defining contracts of adhesion and concluding that they ought to be considered presumptively unenforceable); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and 
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971) (constructing an “administrative law” of standard form contracts that is designed to restore both fairness and consent to the law of contracts). 
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Contracts of adhesion are not necessarily inefficient or unfair.  It is 
true that consumers generally cannot negotiate the terms of a contract, 
but they cannot redesign a car or a television either.  The market for 
product designs is generally considered efficient because consumers can 
shop among alternative models that are offered, and producers, motivated 
to maximize their profits, will carefully attend to consumer desires.  
There is no a priori reason to assume that consumers cannot engage in 
the same shopping behavior with respect to contractual terms.  It is 
sometimes true that contract terms are harder to understand than product 
design, and always true that such terms are less interesting.  However, it 
is also well accepted among economists that shopping behavior by a 
relatively small proportion of consumers is sufficient to create a 
competitive market.31  The question is whether such shopping behavior occurs and whether firms respond to it. 
Scholars applying the neoclassical economic model to law have often 
tried to answer this question by deductive reasoning.32  They begin with 
the premise that the market must work and then argue that consumers 
necessarily behave in ways that will enable it to do so.  When these 
arguments begin to seem implausible, even to true believers, they 
buttress them by asserting that consumers who are so irrational that they 
will not behave the way a neoclassical economist would predict should 
suffer the consequences.  Such arguments, of course, reintroduce the 
legal moralism, the emphasis on fairness and just results, that law and 
economics claims to extirpate.  In fact, consumer behavior regarding 
form contracts is an empirical question and a question that lends itself to 
psychological and sociological analysis.33  Economic discussions of 
form contracts that are not informed by these other social sciences are 
 
 31. George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1347 (1981).  But see R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: 
The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 635–36 (1996); Meyerson, supra note 30, at 1270–71. 
 32. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 31, at 1297–99; Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, 
Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and 
Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1392 (1983); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, 
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 631 (1979). 
 33. See William K. Brandt & George S. Day, Information Disclosure and 
Consumer Behavior: An Empirical Evaluation of Truth-in-Lending, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 297, 297–99 (1974); Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 212, 213 (noting that empirical evidence is needed to better understand the bargain principle); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market 
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 638–40 (1999) (utilizing behavioral research to outline a new model of the human decisionmaker); Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, 
Standard Form Contracts and Contract Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the 
Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers’ Propensity to Sue, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 83, 84 (1997). 
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therefore inadequate.  In other words, the only approach to consumer 
contracts that makes sense is a socioeconomic one. 
This socioeconomic approach to consumer contracts, like the transaction 
cost economics approach to contracts between businesses, provides a 
framework for teaching consumer contracts in a real contracts course.  
Once again, the primary source materials should be the contracts 
themselves.  The content of these contracts can be analyzed according to 
the principles of transaction cost economics that were discussed in the 
previous section.  Students can be asked why the seller chose particular 
terms.  Very often, the explanation is that the seller wanted to reduce the 
uncertainty of judicial interpretation by denying liability, or to reduce 
the uncertainty and expense of judicial interpretation by providing self-
help remedies.  Conscientious sellers need to protect themselves against 
opportunistic behavior such as nonpayment or the return of merchandise 
that is not defective.  In addition, they want to establish a framework for 
their ongoing relationship with the buyer that will secure brand loyalty 
and thus protect the value of specific assets.  Less scrupulous sellers want to 
reap the maximum profit from a single transaction and are not concerned 
about future dealings with the buyer.  In addition to this passive process of 
interpretation, students can be given the participatory exercise of 
drafting a consumer contract.  They can be asked to achieve particular 
objectives on behalf of either conscientious or unscrupulous sellers. 
With consumer contracts, however, questions arise that are generally 
not present in business-to-business contracts.  These involve the way 
that the buyer perceived the seller’s terms.  One approach to these 
questions is as participatory as contract drafting; students can be asked 
to simply read the contract and explain their own understanding of its 
terms.  Although they are in law school, first-year law students may be 
closer to ordinary consumers than to experienced contractual drafters, 
and their own comprehension, bewilderment, or boredom will provide 
some insight into the problems involved in understanding contractual 
terms.  They can then be given a few simple articles that describe what is 
known about consumer behavior and asked to analyze the contract from 
that perspective.  The fact that these articles are likely to be drawn from 
sociology or social psychology journals is not a sign of their irrelevance 
to law, but a recognition that many crucial areas of law, such as the 
study of contracts themselves, are best approached on the basis of 
socioeconomics. 
Having analyzed consumer contracts from the consumer perspective, 
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the transaction cost and consumer sociology approaches can then be 
combined by asking the students whether the use of particular contracts 
is efficient or fair.  These considerations lead to the next level of 
analysis, which involves consumer protection legislation.  During the 
past several decades, a number of major federal statutes have been 
enacted to regulate consumer contracts, including the Truth in Lending 
Act34 and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.35  State statutes often track 
the federal statutes, but sometimes contain novel provisions.  Because 
first-year contracts courses are really courses in contract adjudication, 
and because the justification for teaching adjudication and not contract is 
an emanation of the formalist deification of the common law, these 
statutes are not taught, and frequently not mentioned, in first-year 
contracts courses.36  Taking account of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
and thus acknowledging the awful truth that the common law of 
contracts has been largely displaced, represents the largest dose of 
reality that most current “Contracts” courses can tolerate.37  In fact, 
consumer protection legislation is a major force in shaping consumer 
contracts.  This legislation can be analyzed from the drafter’s 
perspective in the same way that judicial decisions regarding business 
contracts are analyzed.  Students can be shown consumer contracts 
subject to a particular statute and asked how the drafter responded to its 
requirements, and what  she did to achieve her client’s original purposes 
despite the existence of the statute.  Moreover, a real contracts course 
can go beyond this perspective and ask whether the legislature should 
have enacted the statute on either efficiency or fairness grounds.  This does 
not present the same dangers as asking whether the judge should have 
reached a particular decision, because legislation is also underemphasized in 
legal education, whereas the analysis of judicial decisions is its continuing, 
unhealthy obsession. 
 
 34. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1601–13, 1631–41, 1671–77 (2000)).  35. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–12 (2000)). 
 36. See H. Miles Foy, III, Legislation and Pedagogy in Contracts 101, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1273, 1274 (2000).  Foy, however, limits his discussion to the U.C.C. and the Restatement of Contracts and does not discuss consumer protection laws.  37. Thus, the U.C.C.’s unconscionability provision, U.C.C. § 2-302, is the only statutory provision for consumer protection that first-year law students ever see.  See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2002). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
There was never much excuse for legal education’s failure to teach 
contracts.  The only excuse that ever made much sense is that there was 
no systematic methodology for analyzing contracts, so the study of 
contracts seemed too mundane and anecdotal for a graduate program in a 
university.  Socioeconomics solves this problem by providing a methodology 
for analyzing contracts themselves.  By combining transaction cost 
economics, which is itself a combination of economics, organization 
theory, and law, with sociology and social psychology, this interdisciplinary 
approach opens a new world for law teachers.  Contracts themselves can 
join judicial decisions as primary source materials for law students.  
Business strategy can be added to judicial decisionmaking.  Consumer 
legislation can be acknowledged and analyzed.  The entire field of 
transactional law, a major division of practice and a major concern of 
legislative activity, can be opened to the students’ view. 
Transforming the existing contracts course along transactional lines, 
or to put the matter more bluntly, replacing the existing course with an 
entirely new one, is admittedly a daunting proposition, but the transactional 
approach can be added to existing “contracts” courses gradually.  Form 
contracts are readily available, and even negotiated contracts are 
generally easy to obtain.  Most practicing lawyers have contracts in their 
files that can be provided to students with the names redacted, and 
contracts that are in litigation become part of the public record without 
redaction.  Reading even a single contract or engaging in even a single 
drafting exercise will provide the students with some sense of what 
contracts really are and will make the existing courses on contract 
adjudication more concrete and comprehensible for students.  Using 
socioeconomic analysis for even one such exercise will provide students 
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